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SUMMARY
Understanding the nature and role of experiential
knowledge for environmental conservation is a
necessary step towards understanding if it should be
used and how it might be applied with other types
of knowledge in an evidence-based approach. This
paper describes the nature of experiential and expert
knowledge. It then discusses the role of experiential
knowledgeasacomplement to scientificknowledgeand
explains the interplay between experiential knowledge
with conservation research and practice using a simple
conceptual model of how individuals learn. There
are five main conclusions: (1) because experiential
knowledge will always play a role in decision-making,
enhancing ability to learn from experiences (including
research) will have a significant influence on the
effectiveness of conservation outcomes; (2) while
experiential knowledge is qualitatively very different
from quantitative information, both are important
and complementary; (3) some experiential knowledge
can be expressed quantitatively, but experiential
knowledge can be difficult to isolate as single facts
or propositions and qualitative methods will therefore
often be required to elicit experiential knowledge;
(4) because each person’s expertise is unique, when
using experiential knowledge the extent of a person’s
experience and its relevance to a particular problem
need to be specified; and (5) as with any form of
knowledge, there are limitations to that derived from
personal experience. Synthesis and communication of
research is therefore essential tohelpprevent erroneous
thinking and, where possible, experiential knowledge
should be used in conjunction with other types of
information to guide conservation actions.
Keywords: evidence-based conservation, experience, indi-
genous knowledge, tacit knowledge, traditional ecological
knowledge
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INTRODUCTION
Conservation practitioners rarely apply primary research data
and rely heavily on experience to make decisions (Pullin
et al. 2004). This has led to calls for the application of more
science, the adoption of an evidence-based approach, and the
provision ofmechanisms to review anddisseminate research to
ensure that it is accessible (Pullin & Knight 2001; Sutherland
et al. 2004). Such mechanisms are essential to help bridge
gaps between conservation research and practice, to facilitate
the use of the best available evidence when making decisions
(Fazey et al. 2004) and to ensure that untested practices are not
widely adopted simply because they have been used previously
(Sutherland et al. 2004).
While environmental conservation must be informed by
appropriate research, in the end, it is the practitioner who
must decide how to integrate the results of research with a
wide range of context-specific issues and priorities (see Sakett
et al. 2000). The experience of applying conservation actions
also helps to build understanding of complex environmental
systems. Such systems, for the purposes of this paper, include
a collection of social, economic and bio-physical components
that are dynamic and have strong feedback interactions (for
example Whiteman et al. 2004). Understanding of these
systems may or may not have been modified by the results
of research, yet the amount of experience a practitioner has
about a particular environmental system can have significant
implications for conservation (Woodwell 1989).
The value of experience is acknowledged in discussions
about evidence-based conservation (Pullin & Knight 2001;
Sutherland et al. 2004). In these discussions, a clear distinction
ismade between using personal experience to apply the results
of rigorous research and disseminating possibly erroneous
personal experience about the effectiveness of unevaluated
conservation actions. Nevertheless, in conservation, research
and data are usually lacking and outcomes are often uncertain
(Dovers et al. 2001). Given the complexity of environmental
systems and the need for immediate action, experiential
knowledge is often the best evidence that is available (for
example Aswani & Hamilton 2004; Huntington et al. 2004).
There is also considerable difference between disseminating
the opinions of an individual and using rigorous methods to
elicit the experiential knowledge of a group of people with
extensive experience of an environmental system. Finding
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ways to capture experiential knowledge and to integrate or
use it with other approaches is therefore important.
A necessary first step is to understand the nature and role
of experiential knowledge for environmental conservation.
This paper aims to explain how the nature of experiential
knowledge, which is often misunderstood, affects how it
can be elicited and applied. We first describe the nature of
expertise, then discuss the role of experiential and expert
understanding for environmental conservation and research.
The interplay of experiential knowledge with research and
practice is highlighted by a conceptual model that explains
how the capacity to learn from experiences influences an
individual’s ability todevelopunderstandingof environmental
systems.The implications of thenature and role of experiential
and expert knowledge are then discussed in relation to
an evidence-based approach. This paper does not aim to
denigrate the value or need for appropriate and rigorous
research to guide conservation practice. It is also not meant
to provide a detailed account of how people learn, which we
have addressed elsewhere, including a discussion about the
importance of social learning (Fazey et al. 2005a).
THE NATURE OF EXPERIENTIAL
AND EXPERT KNOWLEDGE
Knowledge derived from experience can broadly be separated
into ‘explicit’, ‘implicit’ and ‘tacit’ knowledge (Nickols 2000)
(Fig. 1). Explicit knowledge is that which has been articulated;
implicit knowledge can be, but has not been articulated; and
tacit knowledge (sensu Polanyi 1958) cannot be articulated. To
describe tacit knowledge, Polanyi (1997) gives the example of
being able to recognize a person’s face, but without being able
to explain why or how it is done.
Experiential knowledge can also broadly be separated into
‘expert’ and ‘non-expert’ knowledge (Fig. 1). Compared to
less experienced individuals, experts have acquired extensive
knowledge through their experiences which affects what
they notice and how they organize, represent and interpret
information. Some of the earliest studies of expertise
compared chess masters with extremely good but less
experienced players. While the chess masters almost always
won thematches, researchers could findno difference between
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knowledge Implicitknowledge 
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knowledge 
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Figure 1 Different forms of experiential knowledge.
the two groups in the number of moves they thought they
could make, or the number of possible counter moves they
anticipated from their opponents. The experts, however,
appeared to be able to ‘chunk’ pieces of information together
allowing them to recognize features and patterns not noticed
by the other players (deGroot 1965).
Similarly, peoplewhohavedeveloped adeepunderstanding
of an environmental system through extensive experience
within that system and with other systems may exhibit the
hallmarks of an expert (for example Pierotti & Wildcat 2000;
Whiteman & Cooper 2000). Such individuals may be able to
recognize emergent properties and make good predictions,
even though they might not be able to explain precisely
how they do it. For example, recent research elicited a
rich collection of knowledge from on-ground conservation
managers about the management of water flows in a complex
ephemeralwetland system inAustralia.The ‘experts’ included
both government-employed staff and cattle graziers with
a strong interest in conservation who had many years of
experience living and working within the wetland. The know-
ledge ranged from ecological understanding about the dyna-
mics of the wetland, through understanding of the degree
to which the wetland was threatened, to understanding
about the feedback within the broader social, economic and
ecological system that may have been reinforcing the con-
servation problems (Fazey et al. 2006).
The managers had previously applied their knowledge
to many different situations, including during decision-
making processes for releasing water allocated for maintaining
environmental flows and for arguing for the need for greater
commitment to the conservation of the wetland.Nevertheless,
while some of the expert knowledge could be articulated, the
real extent of their knowledge only became apparent in certain
practical or social situations, such as in workshops where one
piece of information from one manager triggered the recall
of information from another (Fazey et al. 2005a). Expert
knowledge cannot therefore always be reduced to isolated
facts or propositions, and is considered to be much more than
just memory and intelligence, or the use of general strategies
(Bransford et al. 2000).
The managers were also generally reluctant to make
judgements in the absence of a real-life situation and context,
such as predicting the ecological response of the wetland
to different hypothetical flooding scenarios. A hypothetical
scenario could be described to them, but a range of factors
necessary for them to make a judgement would still have been
absent. This temporal-specific and situation-specific nature
of expertise is well documented by educational psychologists
(Barab & Plucker 2002). In one case, researchers posed as
difficult customers to present different arithmetic problems
to children selling produce in markets in Brazil. The children
were correct 99% of the time in the market, but their
performance on the same problems in maths tests was
successful only 65% of the time (Saxe 1992). This implies
that a researcher asking the wrong question, or a question at
the wrong time or in the wrong setting, could elicit different
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or incorrect information compared to that derived in a more
appropriate real-life situation or context.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that experts will always
have correct perceptions about a problem in an appropriate
setting.Recent studies have demonstrated a high prevalence of
large errors in the perception of corporate executives, and it is
clear that effective strategic thinking does not depend on these
managers having a precise understanding of the situations in
which they work. In these cases, immediate knowledge does
not seem to be the greatest asset that executives bring to
strategic decision-making. Instead, it appears to be their ability
to seek and make wise use of feedback (Mezias & Starbuck
2003). That is, they have a good capacity to learn and respond
in a flexible way to events in an uncertain world. This capacity
is referred to as ‘adaptive expertise’ (Bransford et al. 2000).
The on-ground wetland managers in Australia provide a
good example. Some of these had many years of experience
with grazing practices that followed and responded to the
natural and dynamic variability in water flows. The managers
had developed their expertise by being adaptable and by
recognizing and working with the uncertainty in the system.
Their ecological knowledge about the wetland was therefore
likely to be quite different from that of other stakeholders
who did not live on the wetland and whose primary goal was
to control and reduce the uncertainty and variability of water
flow for irrigation purposes (Fazey et al. 2005a).
The value of indigenous (expert) knowledge in the
conservation literature is particularly well recognized (for
example Whiteman & Cooper 2000; Horstman & Wightman
2001; Olsson &Folke 2001; Aswani &Hamilton 2004). Olsson
et al. (2004) highlight the difference between traditional
ecological knowledge, which is an attribute of societies with
a historical continuity in resource-use practice (for example
Whiteman & Cooper 2000; Horstman & Wightman 2001),
and local ecological knowledge, which is an attribute of more
recently evolved resource management systems (Robertson
& McGee 2003; Fazey et al. 2006). In both cases, however,
expert understanding of an ecological system is generally
built through many years of observation and reflection.
This learning process is greatly enhanced when individuals
and/or societies are embedded in that system where they
receive relatively direct ecological feedback from their actions
(Whiteman & Cooper 2000). In many cases, the development
of traditional knowledge is very similar to notions of adaptive
management where there is strong emphasis on feedback
learning and recognition of the unpredictability of ecosystems
(Berkes et al. 2000).
In general, it takes around 10 years to develop expertise of
the form that is typically described in the educational literature
(for example Simon & Chase 1973). There is therefore
considerable difference between expert knowledge, which
exhibits a depth of understanding about an environmental
system, and experiential knowledge, which may not yet have
developed into expert understanding. It is also difficult to
compare one expert with another for dealing with a particular
conservation issue as each expert’s knowledge is built from
a unique set of experiences. Thus, when referring to expert
knowledge, it is essential to be both clear about the basis and
extent of a person’s knowledge and the degree to which the
knowledge is relevant to a particular circumstance.
THE ROLE OF EXPERIENTIAL KNOWLEDGE
There are two interrelated roles of experiential knowledge
for environmental conservation. First, experiential knowledge
can complement a scientific approach either by its integration
with quantified data or by providing an alternative and
separate perspective to an issue or problem. Second, tacit and
implicit knowledge unavoidably guides research and practice.
Experiential knowledge as a complement
to scientific knowledge
In some instances expert knowledge can be articulated
quantitatively and integrated with other quantitative scientific
information to provide a cost effective way of making more
confident predictions (see discussions in Taper & Lele 2004;
Martin et al. 2005). For example, expert opinion proved
valuable for assessing the impacts of grazing levels on bird
density in woodland habitat when it was combined with
survey data using a Bayesian statistical approach, especially
when survey data were unavailable. When the experts agreed,
predictions were found to improve considerably, and when
the experts did not agree, the results were similar to those
obtained when expert information was not used (Kuhnert
et al. 2005; Martin et al. 2005).
Nevertheless, expert knowledge is quite different from
quantitative information,making direct comparisons difficult.
For example, when expert judgement was compared with
computer models for predicting population trends of several
hypothetical species, the opinion of the experts was slightly
less accurate than the simulation models. It might have
been concluded that the quantitative models were most
useful. Yet, it took the experts only 1–2 hours to make the
predictions compared to the 1–2 days to run the models,
making the opinion of the experts a potentially cheaper and
more applicable form of knowledge (McCarthy et al. 2004).
Thus either form of knowledge could be considered more
useful than the other depending on the circumstances towhich
they are to be applied.
There are serious limitations to experiential and expert
understanding, and there is an extensive body of research
that highlights the failure of humans to ‘objectively’ translate
experience into ‘accurate’ explicit information (Sterman
2000). These failings are derived from a number of
shortcomings of thehumanmind.People canbeverydefensive
about changing the way they think (Argyris 1985) and
it may take a long time or particularly significant events
before major changes occur in understanding (Proust 2004).
Humans also tend to have strong judgemental biases (Hogarth
1987), are not good at understanding complex probabilities
(Anderson 2001), and are notoriously poor at learning in and
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about dynamic complex systems (Sterman 2000). Further,
information given by a person may be biased, especially when
there is an outcome that a person desires which may directly
be affected by the information they provide (Dennis 2004).
It is therefore perhaps not surprising that implicit and tacit
information tends to be given less value than information
that is quantified (Boiral 2002). However, it is often forgotten
that despite human failings, people still manage to function
relatively effectively in a complex and ever-changing world.
There are four main aspects of experiential and expert
knowledge thatmaymake it seem less valuablewhen compared
to more accepted forms of knowledge. First, when it is made
explicit, the nature and value of the knowledge changes
because it is no longer linked to the rest of a person’s
rich implicit and tacit understanding. Second, because of
the way information is stored and processed in the brain,
it can be difficult for someone to qualify why or how they
know something (Bransford et al. 2000). Third, experiential
knowledge is difficult to recalibrate against quantitative
and more accepted measures. Fourth, because experiential
knowledge is based on a person’s unique set of experiences
(such as an ecosystem or conservation issue), the degree to
which the knowledge is relevant to specific circumstances
is difficult to determine. Misunderstanding its nature and
not recognizing the difficulty of capturing the information is
therefore at least partly why people place relatively little value
on experiential and expert knowledge.
Qualitative techniques that are applied rigorously have a
greater capacity to capture a larger part of the integrated
and in-depth knowledge of experts than more reductionist
and quantitative approaches. Thus, while they still have
limitations, these approaches have had some success in helping
the application of experiential knowledge to conservation. For
example, farmers’ knowledge of soils has been used to help
make researchmore applicable to practice (Steiner 1998), local
fishing practices in Sweden guided by local knowledge have
been shown to be similar to using an ecosystem management
approach (Olsson & Folke 2001), and local knowledge
has helped determine natural flood regimes to provide a
benchmark for future management targets (Robertson &
McGee 2003). Expert knowledge has also beenused to develop
better understanding about the patterns of vegetation change
and guide conservation priorities (Lykke 2000) and has helped
focus policy and management on some potentially important
impediments to effective conservation action (Fazey et al.
2006). The lack of value that is given to experiential and expert
knowledge is also reinforced by particular cultural biases
and societal views, such as established scientific practices
and the need to describe experiential knowledge in Western
scientific terms (Huntington 2000). Such views are resistant to
change because of consistent reinforcement by the behaviour
of like-minded individuals (see discussions about ‘worldviews’
in Kalu 2001 and Hallowell 2002). Thus, even though
individuals may change their outlook through experiences,
their particular societal perspective continues to reinforce
their thinking behaviour. This reinforcement also occurs
within academic disciplines where the papers that are read and
conferences attended influence the research produced, which
is then reviewed and assessed by a similar-minded group of
researchers.
For example, research output from the discipline of
conservation biology suggests that it is dominated by a
quantitative and reductionist view.The literature published in
2001 in three prominent conservation journals predominantly
comprised quantitative research (89%), inferential statistics
(63%) and studies that focused only on biological
disciplines (87%). There were relatively few studies at
broad organizational scales, such as of communities and
ecosystems (25%) (Fazey et al. 2005b). While quantitative
and reductionist approaches are essential, no single view
(either reductionist or synoptic) is sufficient as a basis for
understanding the world (Kleine 1995). Therefore, although
there are disadvantages, the nature of experiential and expert
knowledge means that it can provide an alternative and/or
additional perspective to that obtained using an experimental
approach (Table 1).
The need for multiple conservation approaches was
recognized in a seminal paper (Soule´ 1985), in which
conservation biology was described as needing to be ‘holistic,
synthetic, eclectic and multi-disciplinary’, dependent on
‘biological and social disciplines’, and a ‘mix of science and
art requiring intuition as well as information’. Soule´’s (1985)
vision captured a general trend by Western society that
has been steadily moving away from the Newtonion model
of knowledge production set in a context predominantly
governed by the interests of a particular academic community
(Gibbons et al. 1994). Instead, in response to increased
complexity, unpredictability and irregularity of society,
knowledge production is increasingly being conducted in a
context of application (Nowotny et al. 2001). This new mode
of knowledge production has less disciplinary boundaries, is
heterarchical, and is more accountable and reflexive to society
(Gibbons et al. 1994).
Such changes in knowledge production are beginning to
occur in many applied conservation and ecological domains,
and there is increasing recognition of the need to understand
how scientific research and societal practices influence each
other and how this relates to achieving more ecologically
sustainable practices (Kates et al. 2001). Yet, irrespective of
whether such trends are perceived to be a positive or negative
development, further societal shifts may be required before
the value of experiential knowledge is more widely recognized
and accepted.
Experiential knowledge unavoidably guides research
and practice
To fully understand the way that expert knowledge influences
conservation research and practice, it is necessary to
understand how an individual’s expertise is developed. To
learn and develop expertise, individuals need to change their
understanding of their place in the world and how they
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Table 1 Some of the differences between expert and experimental knowledge (from Fazey et al. 2005a).
Expert knowledge Experimental knowledge
Perspective Greater capacity for a holistic perspective Greater capacity for a reductionist perspective
Historical perspective Has some capacity to take into account the historical
trajectory of something in order to make better
predictions about the future by interpreting the
present with respect to past experiences (Polanyi
1958). For environmental systems, this requires
extensive experience of the same phenomenon
or system
Has less capacity to take into account the influence of a
historical trajectory because predictions are based
only on what is occurring in the present
Learning from long-term
outcomes
Less capacity to learn from interventions whose
outcomes take a long time to become apparent
because an individual’s experience is finite
and relies more on immediate feedback
Has greater capacity to learn from interventions that
have long-term outcomes because experiments can
run over long periods of time
Dealing with confounding
factors
Has less capacity to deal with confounding factors
when trying to distinguish between cause and
effect
Has greater capacity to deal with confounding factors
when trying to distinguish between cause and effect
Accessibility Difficult for others to access and pick up because
it is can be inarticulate (tacit) or very difficult to
articulate (implicit)
Easier for others to access and pick up because it is
formalized and made explicit
Requirement Requires experimental knowledge as a check and
balance to ensure accurate connections between
cause and effect
Requires expert knowledge to identify appropriate
questions, interpret results and maintain a more
holistic perspective
perceive it (Fazey &Marton 2002). To better understand this
learning process, cognitive psychologists often take the view
that people understand the world by constructing working
representations. That is, people construct ‘mental models’
from their observations and experiences, which then shape
thoughts and actions (O’Connor & McDermott 1997). These
models may also change following new experiences. While
the concept of having a working representation does not fully
capture thedynamic learningprocess, it does allowan arbitrary
boundary to be drawn around a person’s understanding about
a particular environmental system or conservation issue that
occurs at a particular point in time.
If people are effective learners, then they have greater
capacity to develop expert understanding. Figure 2 explains
how an individual’s level of expertise in learning from new
experiences influences their potential to change their mental
model and develop their understanding of an environmental
system. To understand Figure 2, it is easiest to begin with
the variable ‘ability to change mental model’. With a new
experience, as the potential for change increases, dogmatic
commitment to an existing model becomes less likely. The
ability of an individual to change their understanding of an
environmental system increases, allowing the identification of
questions of which the individual may previously have been
unaware. This, in turn increases their potential to re-evaluate
their current mental model, closing the feedback loop (Fig. 2,
R1).
As a person’s understanding of an environmental system
changes, their capacity to build a new or modify an existing
formal theory increases. The act of making implicit theories
explicit by building a formal theory helps a person to:
(1) identify and ask new questions (Fig. 2, R2), and (2)
articulate their understanding to other people to gain different
perspectives of how the system might operate (Fig. 2, R3).
Theories onlydescribe apart of the realworld, and irrespective
ofwhether they are personal or formal, they all have limitations
(Lindenmayer et al. 2002). Making personal theories explicit
so that they can be shared with others helps an individual to
identify those limitations, which also heightens their potential
to re-evaluate the accessible parts of their existing mental
model.
Being a good learner primarily depends on the capacity to
do two things (Fig. 2). First, taking different perspectives
on an event or situation allows greater opportunities to
understand an environmental system because that system can
be ‘seen’ from different angles. That is, there will be greater
potential for a person to re-evaluate their current mental
model (Fig. 2). This is highlighted by research that aimed to
develop participants’ understandings about a complex water
management problem in Switzerland. A simple role-playing
board-game was used that allowed different stakeholders to
put themselves in the situation of others. Not only was the
technique useful for sharing perspectives, but it also allowed
people to discover how their actions affected and interacted
with the decisions of different stakeholders. Consequently,
participants developed a much wider understanding of the
dynamics of the environmental system (Pahl-Wostl & Hare
2004).
Second, a good learner also needs to be open to the potential
for an experience to change their mental model, and develop
expertise in determining when it is appropriate to do so
(Fig. 2). Most people are familiar with instances where
their current understanding is severely challenged by new
information and with the deep reluctance they feel towards
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Figure 2 A conceptual model of how the level of expertise in
learning from an experience influences a person’s capacity to learn
about environmental systems. To understand the model, it is easiest
to start with the component ‘ability to change mental model’ (see
text). The model is a causal loop diagram. The polarity of each
arrow indicates whether a variable increases or decreases when the
previous variable increases. For example, if the ability to change a
mental model increases, then the potential to change understanding
about an environmental system also increases (see Sterman 2000 for
a full account of causal loop diagrams). Note that in this diagram, all
the arrows are positive, creating reinforcing loops (see text).
accepting that their current understanding may be wrong.
This is particularly prevalentwhen a person has a closedmind,
where they lack an intention to change, or where they have a
commitment to something that might be affected by such a
change. Discipline in thinking andmindfulness of how people
react to different experiences and perspectives therefore needs
to be developed. People also need to become skilled in
different ways of thinking, such as being empathic, flexible,
inquisitive, asking pointed questions, evaluating different
modes of approach and being self-reflective (Perkins et al.
2004). That is, amind that is both adventurous and cautious in
its acceptance of new information needs to be developed. Such
thinking abilities are akin to those often espoused as being
important for any researcher to be effective (Antonacopoulou
2004).
Understanding how expertise is developed highlights
three important issues regarding the role of experiential
knowledge. First, experiential knowledge unavoidably guides
conservation research and practice. Over 95% of mental
activity is unconscious, affecting how humans conceptualize
Figure 3 Mental models, which are built from observation and
experiences, influence the way people perceive new experiences.
This includes influences on how people perceive the experience of
conducting research, such as by affecting the questions that are
pursued, the methods used to design studies, the way data are
collected and how they interpret the results.
all aspects of their experience (Lakoff & Johnson 1999), and
people are often unaware of how much tacit and implicit
understanding influences their research and the decisions they
make (Polanyi 1958).When conducting research, for example,
a person’s mental model influences the questions identified
andpursued, themethods used to answer those questions, how
the results are interpreted, and how they evaluate the impact
of the research experience on their mental model (Fig. 3).
The tools used to interpret the world (such as science, GIS,
computers) are also designed using mental models, thereby
influencing what is measured, defined and given attention to
(Sterman 2000).
Experiential knowledge therefore provides the basis for
identifying problems, how people go about understanding
them, and what they do about them. For example, in the
Solomon Islands, indigenous ecological knowledge was vital
in identifying appropriate marine reserves for conserving
populations of bumphead parrotfish. The indigenous
knowledge helped to explain how different habitats structured
the size distribution of the fish and how lunar periodicity
affected fish behaviour and catch rates. It also enabled the
identification of sensitive locations and habitats that were in
need of protection that would otherwise have required a high
level of detailed and prohibitively expensive scientific research
(Aswani & Hamilton 2004).
Second, the results of research, as a particular form of
experience, may influence and help change current under-
standing. Conducting rigorous reviews and disseminating
them using an evidence-based approach is particularly
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important for dispelling ‘myths’ about the effectiveness of
certain conservation actions and for breaking the tendency to
reinforce particular ways of thinking (Sutherland et al. 2004).
Third, while information from research (scientific or
otherwise) may alter a person’s understanding, reinforcing
feedback (Fig. 2, loops R1–R3) also demonstrates how
their thinking can become constrained. Even though their
understanding of the system may be changing with new
experiences, a person may also be reinforcing particular
ways of thinking about that system, or possibly ways of
thinking about the approaches used to try to improve their
understanding, such as using quantitative or qualitative
research methods, or a particular field-survey method. For
example, census counts of bowhead whales in Alaska in the
1970s indicated there were c. 2000–3000 whales (Huntingdon
2000). The visual counts of migrating bowheads were from
sites on high cliffs or pressure ridges in the ice, and were made
on the assumption that when the pack-ice was closed, the
whales stopped their migrations. However, when travelling
across the ice, Eskimowhalers often came across whales which
were either migrating beyond the ice flows or were breathing
through cracks in the ice. The whalers challenged the counts
of the scientists, and collaboration between the two groups led
to the census being expanded to include aerial and acoustic
survey techniques to complement the visual counts.Theuse of
multiple techniques, which provided additional perspectives,
led to a new estimate of 6000–8000 whales (Huntington 2000).
Reinforced thinking also partly explains why certain formal
theories with significant limitations can remain unquestioned
for a long time. Initially, a theory may open up new insights
into the way people think, but then their eyes begin to see the
world through the lens of that theory. The acceptance of the
theory can also be reinforced because of people’s tendency to
read or publish in certain journals, present at particular types
of conferences, and work with people who generally think and
feel the same way. The application of Island Biogeography
Theory to terrestrial systems for conservation is a good
example. Despite its many limitations, the theory was widely
accepted for many years and generated a plethora of related
research. It has been suggested, however, that a return to what
researchers were thinking about before the theory’s inception
is needed to avoid both constrained ways of thinking and
ineffective conservation policies (Haila 2002).
There is therefore a complex interplay between experiential
knowledge and the results of research. Tacit and implicit
knowledge guides what and how research is conducted,
while the process and results of the research provide a
particular form of experience that may help people change
their understanding. Research may also help them break
particular, possibly erroneous ways of thinking. However,
because future understanding is guided by what has already
been experienced, particular views can be reinforced. This
means that understanding about an environmental system
or conservation issue may continue to develop, but that it
may only be developing from a particular perspective and
in a particular direction. Understanding will therefore be
constrained if there is a dogmatic commitment to a specific
research method, theory, paradigm or societal outlook.
The strongest defence against people’s current mental
models driving them down particular thinking paths is their
expertise in learning (Fig. 2). Taking a step back and finding
newways of looking at an issue reduces the tendency to assume
that theway something is perceived is the onlyway, or that it is
the same way others perceive it. Taking different perspectives
gives greater potential for re-evaluating understanding of
something, and if people are open to how those perspectives
might influence their mental representations of the world,
their potential to be willing to develop understanding also
increases.
WHY EVIDENCE-BASED CONSERVATION AND
EXPERT KNOWLEDGE ARE BOTH IMPORTANT
We agree with the proponents of evidence-based conservation
(Pullin&Knight 2001;Sutherland et al. 2004) that a revolution
is required in the way conservation is conducted, and that an
evidence-based approach is a good way to begin facilitating
better environmental learning. The evidence-based approach
is particularly important for three reasons: (1) it encourages
the review of what is often disparate and inaccessible research;
(2) it provides a forum for the dissemination of synthesized
research; and (3) it sets a precedent for reviewing current
information, formulating plans, and then evaluating and
disseminating the outcomes (Fazey et al. 2004; Sutherland
et al. 2004). Given the high degree of dynamic complexity
in environmental systems, we suggest that the strength of
the approach is likely to be its capacity to facilitate greater
reflection and learning fromconservation interventions, rather
than just its provision of detailed a priori evidence for those
actions.
Through greater accessibility to the results of research,
individuals are more likely to be exposed to different
perspectives providing them with greater opportunity to re-
evaluate their mental models (Fig. 2). This helps break par-
ticular, possibly erroneous, ways of thinking (Sutherland et al.
2004). In addition, an evidence-based approach encourages
individual practitioners to apply some of the principles of
reflective practice by setting precedents for greater evaluation
of conservation actions. Such reflection is vital for the
development of an individual’s expert knowledge (Fazey et al.
2005a). However, disseminating information is only one step
towards implementation (Lomas 1993), and the effectiveness
of conservationdecisionswill be heavily influencedbypeople’s
expertise of an environmental system because practitioners
will always need to determine how to apply research results in
context-specific and dynamic settings.
Compared to one person’s experience of an intervention,
the accumulation and dissemination of the experience ofmany
individuals could be particularly powerful (Sutherland et al.
2004). However, accumulating information often loses the
detail of what, how and why an intervention was applied.
In particular, a practitioner may have a certain degree of
8 I. Fazey et al.
understanding about the historical trajectory of a problem,
whereas predictions from experiments are mostly based
on a snapshot of what is currently occurring (Table 1).
Because environmental systems are complex, ‘learning-by-
doing’ approaches like adaptive management (Walters &
Holling 1990) or the application of local expert knowledge will
also be required (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005).
Nevertheless, such approaches would benefit from, and are
complementary to, evidence-basedpractice (Fazey et al. 2004).
Because studies with rigorous experimental designs are
easier to systematically synthesize than studies that lack
strict control, the amount of available evidence that is
reviewed can become skewed towards interventions that make
better experiments. For example, in medicine there is often
considerable evidence that has been reviewed for the use of
pharmaceuticals, compared to more individually tailored and
holistic approaches such as counselling or cognitive therapy to
treat mental illness (R. Woodward, personal communication
2004).To avoid similar problems, environmental conservation
will therefore need ways to integrate different types of
knowledge to ensure that it does not become preoccupied with
management solutions that make good experimental studies
when more novel or holistic ways are required to treat the real
causes of the problem (Fazey et al. 2004).
To make sure that people do not head down particular
thinking paths that reduce their acceptance of other
approaches, people need to regularly take a step back, take
different perspectives and be open to how something might
change their way of thinking. That is, individuals will need to
rely both on expertise in being able to learn from experiences
andon their individual expert understandingof environmental
systems to maintain focus on what is important. Without such
understanding, much of conservation research would ‘spread
into a desert of trivialities’ (Polanyi 1958).
Knowledge management has become a major industry
(McManus et al. 2003), and many organizations are trying
to find ways to capture the implicit and tacit knowledge
of employees before they move elsewhere (Holloway 2000).
For example, in medicine, intranet systems are increasingly
being used to capture, share and reflect on implicit
and organizational information (Mimnagh 2002). Finding
better ways to disseminate implicit knowledge could also
benefit many conservation organizations. Mechanisms for
the management of explicit knowledge may need to be in
place for implicit knowledge management to work (Mimnagh
2002). Thus, provided that the value of implicit knowledge
is recognized, an evidence-based approach could be a useful
springboard for a much wider revolution that includes the
development and sharing of experiential knowledge.
CONCLUSIONS
There are five main conclusions arising from this paper about
the nature and role of experiential and expert knowledge
for conservation. First, experiential knowledge derived from
a mixture of research, work, educational, and personal
experience will always play an important role in decision-
making, and will have a major influence on the way
environmental systems are studied and managed. Developing
the capacity to learn better from experiences (including
learning from the results of research) and the ability to re-
evaluate ways of thinking will have a significant influence on
the effectiveness of conservation outcomes.
Second, tacit and implicit knowledge is often considered
to be less important than quantitative or explicit information.
However, while an expert’s knowledge is qualitatively very
different from scientific knowledge both are important and
inherently linked. The depth of understanding that the
different types of knowledge provide, and the manner and
context in which they are applied, will largely determine their
comparative value.
Third, some experiential knowledge can be articulated
quantitatively and integrated with other quantitative
information. However, experiential knowledge can often be
difficult to isolate as single facts or propositions, and it loses
much of its value because it is then no longer linked to the rest
of the person’s implicit or tacit understanding. Thus other,
qualitativemethodswill be required to elicit and communicate
much of the knowledge that can be made explicit.
Fourth, there is no single definition of an ‘expert’. It is
difficult to compare one expert with another for dealing with
a particular conservation issue as each expert’s knowledge
is built from a unique set of experiences. It also takes
considerable time to develop the form of expertise that
is typically discussed in the educational literature. When
referring to expert knowledge, it is therefore important to
be clear about (1) the basis and extent of this knowledge, and
(2) the degree towhich the knowledge is relevant to a particular
circumstance.
Finally, as with any form of knowledge (including science),
experiential knowledge has limitations and there is much
potential for people to generate erroneous thinking. This
means that (1) effectiveways of synthesising anddisseminating
research are essential to increase the potential for individuals
to re-evaluate their current ways of thinking, and (2) wherever
possible, an experientially-based approach should be applied
in conjunction with other approaches.
An evidence-based approach is important for increasing
emphasis on reviewing the effectiveness of conservation
management. In addition to making research more accessible
to the wider conservation community, the process could
also facilitate personal development and understanding about
environmental systems through increased reflection. Yet, to
give rise to better understanding, academics and practitioners
will also need to be open to the perspective that it is a
worthwhile endeavour to find appropriate ways to elicit,
communicate and share experiential knowledge.
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